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Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma 
Maciej Witek, Zielona Góra  
It can be said that Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argu-
ment initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one 
of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of 
methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes 
that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of 
mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to 
Wittgenstein as their forerunner.  
I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does 
not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not 
in the head, even though it undermines methodological 
solipsism. I also claim that both internalism and external-
ism are not free from serious problems. Therefore we need 
a view that goes beyond the distinction in hand. To arrive 
at such a view I examine John Searle’s account of mental 
content and argue that the real tension within the theory of 
content is between the first-person and the third-person 
point of view.  
1. Terminological preliminaries 
Let me begin with some terminological preliminaries. First, 
I shall define the distinction between narrow and wide 
content. The distinction has been introduced by Hillary 
Putnam in his article “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975). 
The narrow content of mental states is fully determined by 
facts about these states. The content in question is 
sometimes described in terms of the functional or concep-
tual roles of mental representations. The wide content, on 
the other hand, consists in part of the referential relation 
mental states bear to social and natural aspects of their 
environment.  
Putnam introduces the distinction in hand by means of 
the well-known Twin Earth thought experiment. The Twin 
Earth is just like our Earth except for the fact that the liquid 
filling the twin seas and falling from the twin skies is not 
H2O. Actually, even though it is indistinguishable from 
water by our normal common-sense criteria, it has a 
complicated chemical structure abbreviated as XYZ. 
Imagine now that every citizen of the Earth has a doppel-
ganger on the Twin Earth. Suppose next that Oscar1 and 
his twin Oscar2 are type-identical down to the last particle. 
Hence their mental states are also type identical. But when 
Oscar1 and Oscar2 utter the word “water”, even though 
their minds are in indistinguishable functional states, they 
mean different substances. Whether they know it or not, 
Oscar1 refers to the chemical compound H2O, while Oscar2 
refers to XYZ. Putnam concludes that the description of 
the narrow content of a given mental state does not 
determine the thing the state refers to. Hence meanings 
are not in the head, since the determination of the referent 
of a given mental state calls for its description in terms of 
wide content.  
The Twin Earth fantasy allegedly shows that the content 
of our mental states depends on physical and chemical 
properties of our environment. Another example aims to 
justify the view that our social environment affects the 
content of our mental states. Imagine a man, who – like 
Putnam in his own story – cannot tell beech-trees from 
elm-trees. The man attaches the same concepts – or, 
more precisely, the same stereotypes – to the words 
“beech” and “elm”, though he knows that these terms 
denote two different natural kinds. However, Putnam 
points out, the extension of “elm” in the man’s idiolect 
consists of elms and nothing else while the extension of 
“beech” in his idiolect is made up only of beeches. People 
who are ignorant about trees can nevertheless employ the 
words “elm” and “beech” correctly provided there are some 
experts in dendrology in their community. On the one 
hand, it is the case that an individual’s narrow mental 
content fails to determine its extension. But, on the other 
hand, there is the so-called “linguistic division of labour” by 
means of which a given word on every occasion it is 
uttered has the constant extension, no matter whether the 
speaker is an expert or not.  
According to Putnam the Dendrologist Puzzle and the 
Twin Earth thought experiment show that the linguistic 
content that is truly worth its name – namely the content 
that does determine extension – is to be described in 
terms of both social and natural aspects of the speaker’s 
environment. In short, meanings are not in the head.  
Now we can define other relevant concepts in terms of 
narrow and wide content. According to methodological 
solipsism – as well as internalism – the only notion of 
mental content we need in the philosophy of mind is the 
notion of narrow content. Externalists, in contrast, claim 
that the theory of narrow content fails to account for the 
referential character of mental states and therefore we 
have no alternative but to employ the notion of wide 
content. To determine the linguistic content of the words 
uttered by a speaker, one needs to take into account – in 
one way or another – the causal relations between his 
mind and external things. But the last remark gives rise to 
a real dilemma: whether the dependence of mental content 
on external factors is to be described from the first-person 
point of view or from the third-person point of view. The 
externalist adopts the third-person solution. He assumes, 
moreover, that the first-person solution inherits all 
problems from internalism. In my view, however, there is a 
considerable difference between the conception of narrow 
content and the first-person solution. While the former 
faces familiar problems, the latter seems to offer an 
account that goes beyond the internalism-externalism dis-
tinction and the problems it generates. In the rest part of 
my paper I examine whether the first-person account of 
mental content meets these expectations.  
Before we get into details, however, it would be useful to 
say a word about Wittgenstein’s influence on the discus-
sion between internalism and externalism.  
2. Wittgenstein on mental states 
It is an interesting fact that some proponents of external-
ism suggest more or less openly that their views have their 
origins in Wittgenstein’s remarks on the relation between 
language and thoughts. Granted, in the remark 304 of 
Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein dismisses, as a 
misunderstanding, the idea that the main aim of language 
is to convey thoughts. In other words, thinking is not a 
language-independent process, the components of which 
serve as the meanings of our words. In fact, our words 
owe their meanings to their use as tools of social interac-
tion. Describing our thoughts, then, we have no option but 
to employ public language. In short, the Private Language 
Argument undermines the idea that our thoughts provide 
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our words with meanings. It is rather the social process of 
verbal communication that provides our thoughts with 
mental content.  
One could be tempted to count Wittgenstein’s view as a 
form of externalism. Of course there are some remarks in 
Wittgenstein’s writings that can be construed along 
externalist lines. For example Gareth Evans in his paper 
“Causal Theory of Names” (1973) revokes the famous 
remark from Philosophical Investigations that if God looked 
inside my mind He couldn’t tell who I am thinking about. 
Besides, Putnam’s slogan “meanings are not in the head” 
resembles other remarks to be found in the same book. In 
my view, however, Wittgenstein’s positive proposal is not 
so clear. There is no doubt that his Private Language 
Argument amounts to the rejection of methodological 
solipsism. But he does not settle the dilemma whether the 
first point of view in the theory of mental content is 
adequate or is a mere “grammatical puzzle”. 
I assume the minimal interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
conception of mental content. There is no obvious step 
from his rejection of methodological solipsism to his 
alleged embracement of externalism. What is more, we 
should be very suspicious of this step, since the internal-
ism-externalism distinction does not cover the whole 
variety of positions.  
3. Internalism, externalism and their prob-
lems 
Internalism claims that every mental content worth its 
name is to be identified with a functional or conceptual 
role. In short, every mental content is narrow in the sense 
that its adequate description makes no reference to 
external factors, whether physical or social. In this 
connection internalism promises a homogenous explana-
tion of mental activity. It simply assumes that what affects 
a given mental state is, in most cases, another mental 
state. 
Putnam’s examples show that the explanation of mental 
states in terms of narrow content is not adequate. The 
decisive objection is that narrow content conceived as a 
functional state of mind fails to determine extension. In 
short, internalism fails to account for the referential or 
intentional character of mental states.  
Externalism attempts to explain the intentionality of 
mental states. It assumes that mental content depends on 
external aspects of the physical and social environment of 
the mind. Roughly speaking, according to the externalist 
solution my mental state is about that particular object and 
not another because it is the very object that causes my 
state. There are, however, some reasons for believing that 
this explanation fails.  
First, the externalist explanation seems to miss the 
crucial idea of intentionality. As John R. Searle has pointed 
it out, “the solution is from a third-person point of view” 
(1983, 63). It sets the conditions under which an observer 
can tell whether I refer to that object or not. But it says 
nothing about my intentions. Namely it does not set the 
conditions under which I take myself as referring to that 
particular object.  
Second, there is a tension between the externalist moral 
drawn from the Dendrologist Puzzle and the Principle of 
Charity (I am grateful to Adam Grobler for this observa-
tion). If Oscar utters a sentence “One beech in our avenue 
has been blown down” and actually it is an elm-tree that he 
is talking about, an expert can answer “That’s true. But 
actually, it is an elm”. The Principle of Charity supports the 
assumption that Oscar has made his statement in 
accordance with his best knowledge. The expert also 
knows, first, that people often cannot tell beech-trees from 
elm-trees and, second, that the last storm has blown down 
one of the elm-trees in our avenue. All these assumptions 
lead the expert to the conclusion that the word “beech” as 
uttered by Oscar was referring to the broken elm. The 
conclusion, however, contradicts Putnam’s opinion that 
due to the division of linguistic labour the word “elm” in 
Oscar’s idiolect, on every occasion it is uttered, denotes 
elms. The point is that Oscar has used the term “beech” 
referentially in the sense introduced by Keith S. Donnellan, 
and the referential use calls, as I state in the next section, 
for explanation from the first-person point of view.  
It turns out that both internalism and externalism face 
serious problems. Therefore the tempting solution is to 
advance a theory that goes beyond the distinction. I think 
that Searle has developed such a theory, even though he 
calls himself an internalist (1983, 198).  
4. Searle on mental content 
According to the account developed by Searle in Inten-
tionality every mental act is intentional in the sense that it 
has an intentional content that sets its conditions of 
satisfaction. The conditions are to be described from the 
first-person point of view and their specification involves 
the idea of causation.  
In this section I focus on three of Searle’s claims. First, 
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment does not imply 
that meanings are not in the head. Second, the adequate 
account of linguistic content has to employ the first-person 
point of view. Third, contrary to appearances, the account 
in question has nothing to do with methodological 
solipsism, and hence is not subject to the Private Lan-
guage Argument.  
Searle argues that the Twin Earth fantasy can be spelled 
out along non-externalist lines (though, as I believe, not 
along internalist lines, for the reasons sketched at the end 
of this paper). Searle’s main point is that the intentional 
content is self-referential. Namely, the description of an 
act’s content makes reference to the act itself. Therefore 
Oscar1’s tokens of “water” refer to the substance that has 
usually caused his previous utterances and perceptual 
experiences concerning water. Similarly, Oscar2’s tokens 
of “water” refer to the substance that has usually caused 
his previous utterances and perceptual experiences 
concerning water. In short, we refer to the intended objects 
by means of their causal descriptions. The descriptions, 
moreover, makes reference to our own intentional states. 
The linguistic reference, therefore, is fully determined by 
what is in the speaker’s head.  
The first-person point of view, moreover, seems to be 
unavoidable in the theory of linguistic content. First, as the 
analysis of the Dendrologist Puzzle in the light of the 
Principle of Charity has shown, the interpreter has to take 
into account the supposed conditions under which the 
speaker takes himself as referring to that particular object. 
In this connection Putnam’s idea of “the extension in one’s 
own idiolect” has no application to the case under 
discussion, namely to the case of the referential use of the 
term “beech”. Second, the interpreter refers to the world by 
virtue of the same mental capacities as the speaker does. 
The social linguistic authority, therefore, is not an abstract 
entity. It consists, instead, of particular people interacting 
with each other.  
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Finally, Searle’s account doesn’t involve methodological 
solipsism. It acknowledges, on the one hand, that we refer 
to the world by means of the descriptions of the way the 
world appears to us. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the 
descriptions are formulated in a public language, and 
hence they are subject to social control.  
5. Conclusions 
It turns out that the distinction Putnam has drawn between 
internalism and externalism calls for reformulation. Accor-
ding to externalism the mental content depends on exter-
nal factors, both social and physical. The dependence, 
however, can be described either from the first-point of 
view or from the third-point of view. I have just argued, 
following Searle, that the former option seems to be ade-
quate, while the latter faces serious problems.  
I propose to replace the distinction with a somewhat 
more complicated picture. Let me start with two questions. 
First, can mental content be captured by that-clauses? 
Second, can mental content be individuated solely by 
means of factors internal to the mind? If the answer to the 
first question is “Yes” and to the second is “No”, we arrive 
at the third-person solution or, in other words, Putnam’s 
externalism. If the first question is settled negatively and 
the second is answered positively, we obtain internalism. If 
both answers are “Yes”, we have the first-person solution.  
The first-person solution is neither internalist nor exter-
nalist. It is not internalist, since it embraces the idea of 
truth-conditions and employs the notion of causal relations 
the mind bears to external things. Nevertheless, the 
causation is part of the internal, intentional conditions of 
satisfaction. Therefore the solution in hand cannot be 
counted as externalism.  
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